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1Asymmetric Benchmarking in Compensation:
Executives are Paid for (Good) Luck But Not Punished for Bad
Abstract
Principal-agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that
captures the eﬀe c to fm a r k e to rs e c t o rp e r f o r m a n c eo nt h eﬁrm’s own performance. Recently, it
h a sb e e na r g u e dt h a tw ed on o to b s e r v es u c hi n d e x a t i o ni nt h ed a t ab e c a u s ee x e c u t i v e sc a ns e t
pay in their own interests, that is, they can enjoy “pay for luck” as well as “pay for performance”.
We ﬁrst show that this argument is ﬂawed. The positive expected return on stock markets reﬂects
compensation for bearing systematic risk. If executives’ pay is tied to market movements, they
can only expect to receive the market-determined return for risk-bearing. We then reformulate the
argument in a more appropriate fashion. If managers can truly inﬂuence the nature of their pay,
they will seek to have their pay benchmarked only when it is in their interest, namely when the
benchmark has fallen. Using a variety of market and industry benchmarks, we ﬁnd that there is
essentially no indexation when the benchmark return is up, but uncover substantial indexation when
the benchmark has turned downwards. These empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative
hypotheses and robustness checks, and suggest an increase in expected direct compensation of
approximately $75,000 for the median executive in our sample, or about 5% of total compensation.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Both the level and the stock-price sensitivity of executive compensation have increased dramatically
since the 1980’s (Hall and Liebman, 1998). The concern has been raised among academics (Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk et al, 2002 ) and practitioners (Crystal, 1991; Rappaport, 2000)
that the boom in pay was at least in part a windfall. That is, executives were enriched for simply
tracking a bull market. Consistent with this view, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) document
t h a tp a yi sa ss e n s i t i v et oe x o g e n o u sl u c ka si ti st oﬁrm-speciﬁc performance and that the linkage
is stronger when shareholders are diﬀuse and arguably passive.1
Our starting point is the observation that an executive whose pay is tied to market movements
has at a bare minimum provided risk-bearing services.2 And by deﬁnition, the systematic com-
ponent of returns provides the fair-market rate of compensation for such services. The argument
applies a fortiori to exogenous, unsystematic shocks such as those that aﬀect only a single indus-
try. Tying compensation to such shocks reduces an executive’s expected utility since the market
provides no compensation for bearing such risks. Thus, Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2001) result
that the sensitivity of pay to exogenous luck is stronger when a large outside shareholder is absent
does not support their conclusion that such executives are able to set pay in their own interests.
The evidence discussed thus far is based on the estimated sensitivity of compensation to various
performance measures.3 A typical regression coeﬃcient will imply that executives’ compensation
changes by $X for every $1,000 change in the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity, regardless of
whether that change was due to ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance or market-wide factors. Our objection
to the Bertrand-Mullainathan (2001) and Bebchuk et al (2002) argument relies on the assumption
that compensation retains its sensitivity to performance when the overall market falls.W ee x a m i n e
this issue systematically, and ﬁnd strong evidence that executives are in fact insulated from bad
1A similar ﬁnding appears in the empirical literature on relative performance evaluation (Antle and Smith, 1986;
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a,1999b).
2In recent work, Jin (2002) shows that the lack of indexation for the average executive is perfectly consistent with
eﬃcient contracting. Moreover, Garvey and Milbourn (2003) show that there is in fact indexation in circumstances
where it would appear eﬃcient, providing managers with insurance when they can least provide for it themselves.
3Total compensation for the individual year is comprised of salary, bonus, other annual pay, the total value of
restricted stock and stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other compen-
sation from the “Summary Compensation Table”.
3luck, while they are rewarded for good luck.4 Our initial argument is that luck-based pay will
be at best a zero-NPV investment from an executive’s point of view. Our evidence of asymmetric
benchmarking implies that actual compensation practice also gives executives a put option on luck,
an option which we estimate to be worth approximately $75,000 per year or about 5% of median
total compensation.
While our empirical ﬁnding that top managers enjoy what appears to be opportunistic bench-
marking is robust to a host of potential benchmark portfolios, there are alternative explanations.
Oyer (2001) and Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) argue that we do not observe benchmarking
in wage contracts because the value of executives’ outside opportunities are also market-sensitive.
This can explain the absence of benchmarking when the market is up; the executive’s market oppor-
tunities are also up and she would quit if you tried to benchmark her. But we ﬁnd that executives
are in fact benchmarked when the market is down. The basic labor market story is symmetric;
when the market is down, the executive’s outside opportunities are also down, so his pay should
also decline. Put another way, the Oyer (2001) story can explain our results only if there is also an
asymmetry in the sensitivity of executives’ outside opportunities to the market. We are unable to
devise a systematic test of this proposition.
A related version of the labor market argument is that executives possess outside opportunities
that are not related to the overall market at all. Examples include working in the non-proﬁt sector,
writing a novel, or pursuing some other form of outside personal interest. This would imply that in
ad o w nm a r k e t ,t h eﬁrm still needs to provide the executive with a minimum level of compensation
to keep her from taking such opportunities. An observationally-equivalent story is that the CEO is
essentially inﬁnitely risk-averse with respect to reductions in pay. Empirically, we can distinguish
this story from opportunistic benchmarking because it also implies that the executives should be
insulated from downside ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk as well as from bad luck. In a variety of speciﬁcations,
we are able to reject this ‘minimum pay’ hypothesis.
4Betrand and Mullainathan (2001) note the appearance of such asymmetry but do not pursue the issue system-
atically. Our measures of luck include industry stock returns at the 2-digit SIC code level, size-based returns, and a
host of broader market indices such as the CRSP value-weighted index and S&P 500. Thus, luck can be more broadly
interpreted as the set of exogenous factors aﬀecting a ﬁrm’s return, which naturally includes the market portfolio.
4The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple model from
which we delineate our empirically-testable hypotheses. Section 3 contains our primary empirical
results, while in Section 4 we provide tests of alternative hypotheses. Concluding remarks are in
Section 5.
2 A Simple Model of Pay for Luck
2.1 Basic results
To ﬁx ideas, consider the following simple, one-period model of an all-equity ﬁrm that employs a
single manager. The executive is paid according to ﬁrm value where initial value is denoted V and
value at the end of the period is denoted:
V1 = V (1 + βrm + δL+ ε).
For simplicity, we normalize the risk-free rate to zero and set the scale factor V =1 . Following
standard notation, rm represents market returns and β is the ﬁrm’s sensitivity to this market factor.
The second shock L is “luck”, and could represent returns to the ﬁrm’s industry, oil prices, exchange
rates, or any other objective index that aﬀects the value of the speciﬁc ﬁrm. The term δ represents
the sensitivity of ﬁrm value to luck, and ε is ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, unrelated to either the market or
to what we term luck. We assume that market risk is priced but that both luck and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk are diversiﬁable, so that E(rm) > 0,a n dE(L)=E(ε)=0 . All shocks are assumed to be
independently and normally distributed. The results in this section generalize straightforwardly to
a setting with multiple systematic factors and multiple luck factors.
Since the terms rm and L are both veriﬁable, the executive’s pay can be separately conditioned
on both factors. To economize on notation, we simply assume that the ﬁrm chooses to link some of
the manager’s pay to ﬁrm value, but do not model the underlying incentive problem that motivates
such a compensation arrangement. The manager’s pay is assumed to take the form
W = w + a(1 + ε)+bmrm + bLL,
5where w represents ﬁxed pay, a is the sensitivity of pay to idiosyncratic ﬁrm value, bm is the extent
to which the manager is paid for market movements and bL is the sensitivity of pay to luck. In
a standard principal-agent setting, the term a would represent the marginal reward the manager
receives for eﬀort since her eﬀorts cannot be disentangled from other ﬁrm-speciﬁcd e t e r m i n a n t so f
value.
If the ﬁrm makes no attempt to distinguish exogenous forces (market and luck) from ﬁrm-speciﬁc
outcomes, we will observe bm = aβ and bL = aδ. That is, the manager is paid as much for market
movements and luck as she is for ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) ﬁnd
evidence that this is indeed the case and argue that this is evidence that at least some executives
have captured the pay process and are able to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders.
To analyze this claim, however, it is not suﬃcient to point to cases where either βrm is large
and positive (i.e., the market has gone up and the ﬁrm has a positive beta), or similarly that W
increased because of good luck (δL). Naturally, if an executive has captured the pay process, she
will use it to increase her expected utility. To address this question, we assume that the manager
has negative exponential utility with a coeﬃcient of risk-aversion given by k. T h i sa l l o w su st o
write the certain-equivalent of her utility in terms of the mean and variance of her compensation:












Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) document that on average managers are paid for luck, that
is, that bm and bL are positive. Whether such an arrangement increases the CEO’s expected utility
depends on the signs of the following:5
∂U
∂bm






The ﬁrst term ( ∂U
∂bm) could be positive or negative. Linking the executive’s pay to market-wide luck
increases her expected utility only if bm <
E(rm)
kβσ2
m . This result has a natural interpretation. Since
5Note that we take partial derivatives with respect to bm and bL and do not consider the possibility that the ﬁxed
component w changes to compensate for any utility losses or gains. We ignore this because to implement it empirically
would require direct estimates of executives’ outside opportunity wages as well as their cash compensation.
6the expected market risk premium is positive, the executive desires some exposure to its shocks.
She gains from such exposure so long as it is not excessive, given her risk aversion. The results on
pay for luck are even simpler. The term ∂U
∂bL is unambiguously negative. The executive wishes to be
insulated from luck because it is risky and the market provides no compensation for bearing such
risks. If an executive has captured the pay process, we would therefore expect bL =0 .
2.2 Results when Executives Have Access to Capital Markets
The results above are similar to those in the standard principal-agent literature in which pay is set
to maximize shareholder wealth, subject to participation and incentive constraints, rather than to
enrich the executives. The interpretation is that it is ineﬃcient to have the manager bear risks that
the shareholders can bear at lower costs if there are no incentive eﬀects. Here, the interpretation
is that even if the manager can choose her own pay, she will not choose to be exposed to risk when
the compensation is insuﬃcient.
Our results imply that the Bertrand-Mullainathan ﬁndings are not necessarily consistent with
their conclusion that at least some managers have captured the pay process. We say “not neces-
sarily” because our model actually implies that bL =0 ,b u tbm =
E(rm)
kβσ2
m . That is, the manager will
choose pay to insulate herself fully from luck, but also to give herself an optimal positive exposure
to the market. Betrand and Mullainathan cannot reject the hypothesis that bm = a/β.T h a t i s ,
pay is equally sensitive to market and to idiosyncratic shocks to value. Absent information about
the manager’s risk-aversion k, we cannot reject the hypothesis that managers are in fact receiving
their most preferred exposure to market shocks through their pay arrangements.
Jin (2002) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) point out that the above analysis ignores the fact
that executives can and do choose securities such as mutual funds for their own private portfolios.
The analysis thus far assumes that they can only invest in the markets implicitly through their
compensation. Suppose to the contrary that the manager can also choose to invest cm dollars of
her risk-free wealth w in the market and cL dollars in a security that tracks the luck factor (an
industry index or oil futures, for example). Since the risk-free rate is zero, we can now write her
7expected utility as:
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Her private investment choices will satisfy the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
∂U
∂cm




= −k(bLδ + cL)σ2
L =0 .
In light of her optimal private holdings, the eﬀect of pay-for-luck on her expected utility is now:
∂U
∂bm




= −kδ(bLδ + cL)σ2
L =0 .
As long as the executive can make her optimal private investment choices cm and cL,s h ei s
now indiﬀerent as to her pay for market shocks or for luck. She can always create her most desired
exposure to the market or to luck, regardless of how her pay is determined. Note that this result
also carries over if the executive believes she has private information about either the market or
luck. She can equally well take “bets” through her compensation or on her own private investments.
Garvey and Milbourn (2003) recognize that at least some executives will not in fact be able
to freely choose their own desired investment positions. Legal restraints or transaction costs, for
example, may prevent her from either taking large short positions in the market or her industry.
Our basic point still holds, however. Markets and industries go down as well as up, and an executive
gains no obvious beneﬁt from being exposed to such risks through her pay. Sometimes she will
prosper from good luck, but other times she will suﬀer from bad luck.
2.3 Second Thoughts: Asymmetric Benchmarking?
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) refer to the phenomenon of pay for luck as managerial “skim-
ming”. This terminology suggests that perhaps managers skim oﬀ the gains to good luck but
manage to avoid the losses from bad luck. Bertrand and Mullainathan note the appearance of
an asymmetry for oil price shocks but do not present systematic tests. The fact that executive
8stock option exercise prices are frequently revised downward after price declines but never, to our
knowledge, upward to reﬂect price increases suggests a similar asymmetry (see, e.g., Chance et al,
2000).
Finally, recent trends in the compensation of the median executive are suggestive of a similar
process. Figure 1 summarizes median values of total direct CEO compensation (the sum of salary,
bonus, long-term incentive payouts, the value of restricted stock and the Black-Scholes-Merton value
of option grants) for the S&P 1500 ﬁrms for the years 1993-2001 from the ExecuComp database
(described in further detail below). For comparison, the line “Market and Compensation” takes
median CEO compensation in 1993 and assumes it grows at the same rate as the S&P 500 for the
relevant years. Thus, it depicts how compensation would have evolved if compensation were simply
determined by the factor rm.
























Two facts are immediately apparent. First, compensation does not move one for one with the
9market.6 More importantly, median compensation grew in the 1990’s with the market, but did not
turn down when the market did. This is suggestive of skimming or asymmetric benchmarking. In
terms of our model, it means that actual compensation is not linear in luck or market movements.
Rather, bm and bL are close to a when the relevant shocks turn out to be positive, but go to
zero or even change sign when the shocks turn out negative. Observe that Figure 1 indicates only
market-wide averages. Many ﬁrms had stock performance that deviated from the average, and
their executive compensation tended to deviate along with it. In the next section, we explore the
issue of benchmarking more systematically.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data are drawn from two sources. Firm returns and estimates of their volatility come from
CRSP, and the compensation data are drawn from Standard and Poors’ ExecuComp. Our sample
period covers the years 1992 through 2001, and Table 1 summarizes the basic compensation and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. These summary statistics cover each ﬁrm’s executive identiﬁed by Execu-
Comp as the CEO given by the CEOANN ﬁeld. This results in 13,737 CEO-ﬁrm years.
Salary and Bonus represent the CEO’s yearly salary and bonus values, respectively, and each
average to approximately $600,000. Cash compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term
incentive payouts, and all other cash compensation paid, and averages $1.3 million. Option Grants
represents the Black-Scholes value of the options granted to the CEO in the year, and average $2.37
million. As is typical for compensation measures, there is enormous right skewness present in the
data. For instance, the maximum value of option grants is well over $10 million, with a median value
at a more modest $0.5 million. To reduce the eﬀects of such outliers, our primary dependent variable
Total Direct Compensation, along with any independent variables in the regression analyses, are
all winsorized at the 1% level. We also estimate robust standard errors.7 We ignore changes in the
6The correspondence would be far closer if we included the value of the CEO’s existing portfolio of stock and
options, since by deﬁnition such securities are equally sensitive to market, luck, and idiosyncratic components.
7Our regression results are also robust to the use of median and robust regressions, which also minimize the eﬀect
10value of the CEO’s existing shares and options because by deﬁnition they move only with the stock
price, and cannot contain any benchmarking component.
The average value of Total Direct Compensation is $4.23 million, and is estimated as the sum
of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other cash payouts, and
the value of restricted stock and stock option awards. CEO Age is the CEO’s age in the data year,
and CEO Tenure is calculated as the diﬀerence in years between the ﬁscal year-end of the current
year and the date at which the executive became CEO, as given by the Became_CEO ﬁeld. Stock
return is the one-year percentage return for the ﬁrm over its ﬁscal year, and Market Cap of Equity
is the ﬁrm’s market capitalization at the end of the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year. The standard deviation of
stock returns are computed using the monthly returns of the ﬁve years preceding the data year.
While our model distinguishes between two exogenous shocks to ﬁrm value (market and luck),
actual ﬁrms are subject to a large number of such shocks. In Table 2, we provide summary statistics
of the set of potential benchmarks we use. These include both the equal-weighted and value-
weighted industry returns, where a ﬁrm’s industry is given by the remaining ExecuComp ﬁrms
in the same 2-digit SIC code. Turning to broader market indices, we include the value-weighted
market return as given by the CRSP value-weighted index, as well as the yearly return on the S&P
500. We also include the return on the ﬁrm’s commensurate size-decile, again taken from CRSP.
Critical to our ability to test the hypothesis that managers opportunistically benchmark their pay
is the fact that the benchmark can take both positive and negative values. To that end, Table 2
summarizes the percentage of the observations for each benchmark that are positive, as given in
the column denoted % Positive. Not surprisingly for our sample period, more than two-thirds of
the sample benchmark returns are positive. However, the years 1994, 2000, and 2001 represented
“down” markets for both the CRSP value-weighted market index and S&P 500.
We provide simple correlations of some key variables in Table 3. Cash Compensation has positive
correlation with CEO age, while Total Direct Compensation has a slightly negative correlation with
CEO age. Not surprisingly, both have a strong and positive association with ﬁrm size as given by
of outliers on coeﬃcient estimates. Variables that are winsorized at the 1% tails are denoted with an asterik in Table
1.
11its market capitalization. Also not surprising is the positive correlation between CEO age and
tenure. Below, we turn to the empirical analysis.
3.2 Pay for Luck Conﬁrmed
We begin our analysis by conﬁrming the result that the average executive receives compensation
for exogenous as well as ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) specify their
tests in two stages. First, ﬁrm performance is regressed on exogenous components such as industry
and market returns, with the resulting predicted value representing what they call luck. This
provides a natural and parsimonious way to deal with the large set of potential indices. In terms
of the model, we estimate the regression:
V1 − 1=βrm + δL+ γX + ε,( 1 )
where ε is the residual from the regression and X represents additional indices plus year dummies.8
Note that the model normalizes beginning of period value to 1. In our regressions, we scale both
ﬁrm returns and the returns on the indices by each ﬁrm’s market capitalization at the beginning
of the year. We then deﬁne the “luck” component of ﬁrm returns as
λ = b βrm +b δL+ b γX,
where b β, b δ,a n db γ are the estimated coeﬃcients from (1).
To test the eﬀect of luck versus ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance on compensation, we then regress
dollar compensation on the separate components:
W = w + aε + bλ + dY,( 2 )
where Y contains controls for executive ﬁxed eﬀects, year eﬀects, and risk (given by the ﬁrm’s
total stock return volatility). This last control variable incorporates the ﬁndings of Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999a). In our ﬁrst regressions, we deﬁne W as the sum of all cash compensation, which
8Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) also include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in their performance regressions. This eﬀectively
says that each ﬁrm’s average performance over the sample period, even after controlling for market and industry
eﬀects, was due to exogenous luck. While our results are qualitatively unaﬀected by adopting their speciﬁcation, we
omit ﬁrm dummies from the performance regression.
12includes salary, bonus, long-term incentive payouts and all other cash compensation paid. In our
second set of regressions, we deﬁne W as Total Direct Compensation, which reﬂects salary, bonus,
long-term incentive payments, all other compensation, plus the market value of restricted stock
granted and the Black-Scholes Merton value of options granted. We focus mainly on total direct
compensation, and primarily treat the cash pay regressions as robustness checks.
Table 4 contains the estimated coeﬃcients for the model given by (2) using ﬁrst cash compen-
sation and then total direct compensation. Turning to column III, we immediately conﬁrm the
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) ﬁnding that executive pay is positively and signiﬁcantly related
to both luck and ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance. That is, we estimate that both b b>0 and b a>0.
In addition to the year and executive ﬁxed eﬀects, this ﬁnding is robust to controlling for lagged
values of total direct compensation (see column IV), as well as to the measure of cash compensa-
tion (columns I and II). Consequently, the conclusion to be drawn from Table 4 is the standard
one. There is essentially no evidence that indexation (or benchmarking) is utilized in the average
executive’s compensation contract. However, as argued above, such a ﬁnding is not suﬃcient to
conclude that the average executive is skimming extra pay at shareholders’ expense. Below, we
present our main ﬁndings related to the apparent diﬀerential indexation awarded to executives as
a function of the realized performance of the benchmark.
3.3 Evidence of Skimming (Asymmetric Indexation)
We now turn to our primary analysis of the skimming hypothesis and its implication for oppor-
tunistic benchmarking. To carry out this test, we simply deﬁne an additional dummy variable,
Down, taking on the value one if estimated luck (λ) is negative and zero otherwise. That is, we
estimate
W = w + aε + bλ + bDλ × Down+ dY.( 3 )
The skimming hypothesis predicts that bD < 0.
In Table 5, we summarize the estimated coeﬃcients using both cash compensation and total
direct compensation. Column III contains the results for total direct compensation. Again, we
13estimate a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between executive pay and both luck and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc performance (i.e., b b>0 and b a>0). However, we also estimate a negative coeﬃcient
for bD that is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. The ﬁndings summarized in Table
4 suggest that, on average, the executive is positively awarded for upward movements in luck,
implying that while executives receives compensation windfalls when good luck is realized, they are
commensurately not insulated on the downside when bad luck is realized. However, what the results
of Table 5 suggest is that the executive is only awarded for good luck. By contrast, if the bad luck
impacts the ﬁrm’s returns, executives are apparently heavily insulated from the fall. The result is
robust to either choice of compensation measure, as well as to lagged values of compensation.9
The primary contribution of our work is that we test the most natural implication of the
skimming approach that provides a strictly diﬀerent prediction than standard agency theory. That
i s ,i ft o pm a n a g e r sc a ni nf a c ti n ﬂuence the form of their compensation, they will seek indexation
(i.e., insurance) only when it is to their advantage to do so. Naturally, insurance is only valuable
to the manager when unfavorable outcomes are realized, and this is what our evidence strongly
suggests. Importantly, we can calibrate the dollar value of asymmetric benchmarking by recognizing
that in essence it provides the manager with the linear exposure to luck that we modelled in the
theoretical section, plus a one-year put option on luck that can be exercised whenever luck turns
out bad (i.e., when Down =1 ). Using median values for market capitalization and the percentage
volatility of luck (approximately 19%), a risk-free rate of 5%, and a sensitivity of pay for bad luck
of -1.5, the option is worth just over $75,000, or approximately 5% of median total compensation
in our sample.10 In the last section that follows, we address some alternative hypotheses that may
explain our ﬁndings.
9These results are also not sensitive to the choice of indices inclued in estimating luck using (1). In fact, for every
combination of our exogenous indices, executives are insulated from bad luck.
10The sensitivity of pay to bad luck equals the sum of the coeﬃcients on luck and the interaction of luck and Down.
144 Alternative Explanations: Labor Market Approaches
The skimming approach views compensation as an arena where rent-extraction takes place. The
speciﬁc ways in which managers extract rents are primarily through inﬂuence over the compensation
committee’s and regulators’ information and incentives. A related approach suggested by Oyer
(2001) and Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) focuses on the managers’ threat of quitting not only
ex ante (as in the traditional principal-agent model), but also ex post, after performance has been
observed.
The simplest version of an ex post quitting model is that the manager has available some outside
opportunity that gives her utility of K, which is unrelated to any aspect of ﬁrm performance. Thus,
the manager will quit unless her total compensation satisﬁes:
W = w + aε + bλ + dY ≥ K.( 4 )
For concreteness, assume that this constraint holds with equality (similar if it is just a threat point).
Note that we could also obtain a similar expression in a classical principal-agent model where the
executive is inﬁnitely risk-averse to income shocks that push her below K (see Scharfstein, 1988,
for an example of this formulation). This view can certainly explain why the coeﬃcient on the
exogenous b is negative when times are hard (i.e., when λ is negative). But it has the further
empirical implication that the same eﬀect should pertain with respect to ﬁrm-speciﬁcp e r f o r m a n c e
(given by ε). That is, the asymmetry we have demonstrated thus far should apply equally well
to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc portion of changes in value. To test this proposition, we create the additional
dummy variable Downf which equals one if ε<0 and zero otherwise. The regression speciﬁcation
is then:
W = w + aε + aDε ∗ Downf + bλ + bDλ ∗ Down+ dY.( 5 )
If minimum pay considerations are the reason for the asymmetric benchmarking we have docu-
mented thus far, we should estimate aD = bD.
Observe that the models of Oyer (2001) and Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) are far more
complete than this simple example; they include eﬀort costs, risk-aversion, and the cost of quitting.
15T h e s eh a v el i t t l ee ﬀect on the benchmarking issues, but rather serve to endogenize the contractual
pay-for-performance term a. One potentially important departure is that the authors also allow
the manager’s outside opportunity to depend on the state of the market. To formalize this in the
most transparent possible way, one can rewrite the participation constraint from (4) as:
W = w + aε + bλ + dY ≥ K + Jλ
⇒ (b − J)λ = −aε +[ K − w + dY],( 6 )
where the second equation is a consequence of the manager’s participation constraint binding in
equilibrium. Here, the value of the manager’s next best opportunity is given by K + Jλ,w h i c hi s
obviously increasing in λ.
The implications for benchmarking are the same as in the simple labor market model, as long
as J is held constant. Observe, however, that there is the additional implication that b is increasing
in J, meaning that there is less benchmarking for managers with higher J. Garvey and Milbourn
(2003) ﬁnd little evidence to support this hypothesis using an empirical proxy for executive mobility
related to the number of each 2-digit SIC Industry’s “top-5 executive” moves between ExecuComp
ﬁrms. It can only explain our results if there is also an asymmetry in the relationship between the
value of the executives’ outside opportunities and the market (or sector) benchmark.
Table 6 contains our estimates obtained from the model in (5). Again, beginning with column
III where pay is deﬁned as total direct compensation, we conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Table 5.T h a ti s ,
executive pay is positively related to both luck and ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance, but the estimated
coeﬃcient on the interaction of luck and the indicator variable representing that luck was bad
(b bD) remains negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Moreover, observe that we also ﬁnd
some support for the notion that executives are at least partially insulated from bad realizations
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance in that b aD < 0. However, the estimates of aD are strictly smaller in
magnitude than the estimates of bD. In fact, we can reject that b aD = b bD at better than the 1% level
for both regressions involving total direct compensation. Apparently, we have slightly less power
when using cash compensation as the measure of executive pay, but the estimated coeﬃcients are
all of the same sign as those above. Thus, we conclude that there is little evidence to support the
16‘minimum pay’ interpretation over the skimming one.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We ﬁnd that executives’ pay seems to be sensitive to market or industry benchmarks only when
such benchmarks are down. This is consistent with the view that important aspects of executive
compensation are not chosen as part of an ex ante eﬃcient contracting arrangement, but rather as
a way to transfer wealth from shareholders to executives.
While our tests are straightforward and the results relatively clear-cut, the skimming approach
still has a long way to go. Our tests are extremely reduced-form in that we do not spell out
in any testable way exactly how executives are able to make such apparently self-interested use of
benchmarks. Clearly, such tests are necessary to more clearly distinguish rent-seeking from eﬃcient
contracting views of executive compensation.
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18Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of CEOs and Firms (1992-2001)
The following data are collected for every CEO in the ExecuComp database as deﬁned by the CEOANN
ﬁeld for each year 1992-2001. Salary and Bonus represent the CEO’s yearly salary and bonus values. Cash
compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive payouts and all other cash compensation paid.
Option Grants represents the Black-Scholes value of the options granted to the CEO in the year. Total
direct compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts,
other cash payouts, and the value of restricted stock and stock option awards. CEO Age is the CEO’s age
in the data year, and CEO Tenure is calculated as the diﬀerence between the ﬁscal year-end of the current
year and the date at which the CEO became CEO as given by Became_CEO. Stock return is the one-year
percentage return for the ﬁrm over its ﬁscal year. Market Cap of Equity is the ﬁrm’s market capitalization
at the end of the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year. The standard deviation of stock returns are computed using the ﬁve
years of monthly data preceding the data year. Compensation data are in thousands, and market values are
in millions of yearly dollars, respectively. Variables denoted with an * have been winsorized at the 1% tails,
such that any value below (above) the 1st (99th) percentile have been set to the value of the 1st (99th)
percentile. Stock returns are winsorized after being transformed to a dollar basis.
Variable Obs Mean Min Median Max SD
Salary 13,737 577.6 0 521.9 4,000 316.3
Bonus 13,737 605.8 0 300 102,015.2 1,552.8
Cash Compensation∗ 13,861 1,329.7 91.7 884.0 8,947.7 1,405.4
Option Grants (Black-Scholes) 13,737 2,371.1 0 521.2 600,347.4 10,638.6
Total Direct Compensation∗ 13,737 3,703.6 177.7 1,817.0 35,241.6 5,541.9
Age of CEO (years) 6,451 57.6 30 58 88 7.8
CEO Tenure∗ 12,223 7.7 0 5.6 35.8 7.1
Stock return 13,737 0.266 -0.991 0.111 617.75 5.40
Market Cap of Equity ($millions) 13,737 5,656.4 0.424 1,199.0 507,216.7 19,158.2
Standard deviation of % returns 13,737 .387 0.102 0.343 3.48 0.194
19Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Performance Benchmarks (1992-2001)
The following data are collected for every ﬁrm in which a CEO in the ExecuComp database is identiﬁed
as deﬁned by the CEOANN ﬁeld for each year 1992-2001. The equal-weighted and value-weighted industry
returns on are based on the ﬁrm’s 2-digit SIC code. Value-weighted market returns are drawn from the CRSP
value-weighted index, and S&P 500 returns and the size-decile returns are both given by CRSP. Summary
statistics for returns are in decimal form. The % Positive represents the proportion of the sample for which
the relative benchmark return is positive.
Variable Obs % Positive Mean Min Median Max SD
Equal-weighted industry returns 13,737 82.6% 0.256 -0.831 0.167 19.97 0.934
Value-weighted industry returns 13,737 73.6% 0.161 -.831 0.146 1.211 0.255
Value-weighted market returns 13,737 68.0% 0.143 -0.111 0.213 0.357 0.164
S&P 500 returns 13,737 68.0% 0.132 -0.130 0.195 0.341 0.166
Size-Based Decile Returns 13,737 79.0% 0.145 -0.135 0.223 0.373 0.176
20Table 3: Simple Correlations Among CEO and Firm Variables
Pairwise correlations are carried out for each of the following data items as collected for every CEO in
the ExecuComp database as deﬁned by the CEOANN ﬁeld for each year 1992-2001. Cash compensation is
the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive payouts and all other cash compensation paid. Total direct
compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other
cash payouts, and the value of restricted stock and stock option awards. CEO Age is the CEO’s age in the
data year, and CEO Tenure is calculated as the diﬀerence between the ﬁscal year-end of the current year
and the date at which the CEO became CEO as given by Became_CEO. Stock return is the percentage
return for the ﬁrm over its ﬁscal year. Market Cap of Equity is the ﬁrm’s market capitalization at the end of
the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year. The standard deviation of stock returns are computed using the ﬁve years of monthly
data preceding the data year. Levels of signiﬁcance levels are given in parentheses below the correlations. *








































































21Table 4: ‘Paying for Luck’
Column I of this table contains an OLS regression of annual CEO cash compensation on the contribution
of exogenous factors (luck) on the performance of the ﬁrm’s dollar returns, the contribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
performance, the cdf of the dollar variance of ﬁrm returns, executive ﬁxed eﬀects and year eﬀects. Column
II contains the estimates from the same regression except that lagged cash compensation is included as an
additional control. Cash compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive payouts and all
other cash compensation paid. Columns III and IV repeat the estimations contained in Columns I and II,
but replace cash compensation with total direct compensation. Total direct compensation is the sum of
salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other cash payouts, and the value
of restricted stock and stock option awards. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and the
coeﬃcients on the intercept, the cdf of the dollar variance, and the year eﬀects are suppressed for convenience.
* indicates diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level.
Cash Pay Total Direct Compensation
Independent Variables II I I I II V




















Executive Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.67 0.56 0.57
observations 13,861 10,265 13,737 10,133
22Table 5: Pay Skimming: The Case of Asymmetric Indexation
Column I of this table contains an OLS regression of annual CEO cash compensation on the contribution
of exogenous factors (luck) on the performance of the ﬁrm’s dollar returns, the contribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
performance, the interaction of luck with an indicator variable (Luck is Down) that takes the value of one if
luck is negative and zero otherwise, the cdf of the dollar variance of ﬁrm returns, executive ﬁxed eﬀects and
year eﬀects. Column II contains the estimates from the same regression except that lagged cash compensation
is included as an additional control. Cash compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive
payouts and all other cash compensation paid. Columns III and IV repeat the estimations contained in
Columns I and II, but replace cash compensation with total direct compensation. Total direct compensation
is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other cash payouts, and
the value of restricted stock and stock option awards. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses,
and the coeﬃcients on the intercept, the cdf of the dollar variance, and the year eﬀects are suppressed for
convenience. * indicates diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level.
Cash Pay Total Direct Compensation
Independent Variables I II III IV




























Executive Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.67 0.58 0.58
observations 13,861 10,265 13,737 10,133
23Table 6: Diﬀerentiating Between Skimming and Labor Market Approaches
Column I of this table contains an OLS regression of annual CEO cash compensation on the contribution
of exogenous factors (luck) on the performance of the ﬁrm’s dollar returns, the contribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
performance, the interaction of luck with an indicator variable (Luck is Down) that takes the value of one
if luck is negative and zero otherwise, the interaction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance with an indicator variable
(Firm is Down) that takes the value of one if the ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance is negative and zero otherwise,
t h ec d fo ft h ed o l l a rv a r i a n c eo fﬁrm returns, executive ﬁxed eﬀects and year eﬀects. Column II contains
the estimates from the same regression except that lagged cash compensation is included as an additional
control. Cash compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive payouts and all other cash
compensation paid. Columns III and IV repeat the estimations contained in Columns I and II, but replace
cash compensation with total direct compensation. Total direct compensation is the sum of salary, bonus,
other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other cash payouts, and the value of restricted
stock and stock option awards. In the row labelled Pr(bD= aD),w ep r o v i d et h ep-value from the test that
bD−aD=0 . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and the coeﬃcients on the intercept, the
c d fo ft h ed o l l a rv a r i a n c e ,a n dt h ey e a re ﬀects are suppressed for convenience. * indicates diﬀerent from zero
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level.
Cash Pay Total Direct Compensation
Independent Variables I II III IV




































Pr(bD = aD) 0.03 0.20 0.00 0.00
Executive Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.67 0.59 0.59
observations 13,861 10,265 13,737 10,133
24